Page 126 - JSOM Fall 2021
P. 126

a thorough history and physical exam. Questions asked in-  a MACE2 score of 25 or above and may not have been within
          cluded where the Soldiers were during the attack, what per-  50 m of the blast. Consultation with the theater neurosurgeon
          sonal protective equipment (PPE) they were wearing, their   was considered; however, it was deferred due to the low acuity.
          distance from the blast center, if they felt the blast wave, and if   Additionally, surgical intervention was not indicated.
          they were in the bunkers. As part of the physical examination,
          each individual received a MACE2 exam. Most of the Soldiers
          that were within 100 m of the blast exhibited symptoms of   Lessons Learned
          headaches, difficulty concentrating, memory concerns, tinni-  Criteria and Timeline Regarding TBI Diagnosis
          tus, irritability, and sleep issues. All of the evaluated Soldiers’   Diagnosis for a TBI is clinical and primarily dependent on a
          neurologic exams were normal, and the majority of the Sol-  patient’s history of symptoms. Though a MACE2 is a valuable
          diers had a MACE2 score > 25, which is considered normal.   tool, it needs to be executed within 12 hours of the event to
          Additionally, several Soldiers reported exposure to fumes, par-  have an optimal and clinically relevant value. Understanding
          ticulates, and smoke from impact sites. In the end, 87 Soldiers   the DoD/VA CPG on TBIs and DoD policy for managing TBI
          were evaluated and diagnosed with TBIs within 24 hours.  patients in a deployed setting – DoDI 6490.11 – is critical in
                                                             providing care to the patient and providing guidance for com-
                                                             mand teams. DoDI 6490.11 incorporates a 50-m radius from
          Potential Causes and Definition of TBI
                                                             a blast for potential concussive events.  However, it does not
                                                                                           2
          The Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6490.11 de-  account for all types of ordinances or channelization of the
          fines a potentially concussive event as including, but not lim-  terrain directing the blast wave. Therefore, medical person-
          ited to:                                           nel should be cognizant of the blast’s context and not forgo a
                                                             TBI diagnosis, even if the individual may not have been within
            •  Involvement in a vehicle blast event, collision, or rollover  50 m (Table 1).
            •  Presence within 50 m of a blast (inside or outside)
            •  A direct blow sustained to the head or witnessed loss of   Accountability and Reporting
               consciousness                                 Timely and accurate reporting of injuries during a mass casualty
            •  Exposure to more than one blast event (the Servicemem-  event may be limited, with the first reports possibly inaccurate.
               ber’s commander should direct a medical evaluation  Reporting casualties requires a medical provider to provide a
                                                             diagnosis and a command element to relay pertinent informa-
          The 2016 DoD/Veterans’ Administration (VA) Clinical Prac-  tion to higher commands. Therefore, a broken chain of report-
          tice Guideline (CPG) defines a TBI as “a traumatically induced   ing impacts timely and accurate information flow. As witnessed
          structural injury and/or physiological disruption of brain func-  during this event, the medical provider and platoon leader were
          tion of an external force. . . .” In addition to a traumatic event   both injured themselves. The injuries sustained by these key
          to the brain, a Soldier must exhibit at least one of the follow-  personnel were a potential contributing factor as to why the
          ing symptoms:                                      initial report was inaccurate, with only zero casualties initially
                                                             reported. All medical personnel should reach out to other units
            •  Any period of loss of or a decreased level of consciousness  occupying the base. This would not only enable an accurate
            •  Any loss of memory for events immediately before or   reporting of casualties but may also expeditiously identify any
               after the injury (posttraumatic amnesia)      medically compromised leadership that needs assistance.
            •  Any alteration in mental state at the time of injury (e.g.,
               confusion, disorientation, slowed thinking, alteration of   Documentation
               consciousness/mental state)                   Accurate medical documentation of all injuries is critical to
            •  Neurologic  deficits  (e.g.,  weakness,  loss  of  balance,   ensuring continuity of care with future medical providers.
               change in vision, praxis, paresis/plegia, sensory loss,   This documentation is also a crucial component for awards
               aphasia) that may or may not be transient     such as Purple Hearts. In this situation, Standard Form (SF)
            •  Intracranial lesions 3                        600s were written for the Soldiers involved and uploaded into
                                                             Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application
          The majority of the Soldiers involved had symptoms consis-  ( AHLTA)-Theater (AHLTA-T). However, roughly 10 days
          tent with an alteration of consciousness immediately follow-  passed between uploading the documents and when the docu-
          ing the blast. Additionally, for several Soldiers, the symptoms   ments became available in AHLTA-T. Notably, documenting a
          were ongoing. Per the CPG for the alteration of consciousness   concussion in AHLTA-T triggers additional reporting mecha-
          (AOC), mental status is defined as “. . . immediately related   nisms for potential casualties in a deployed location.
          to the trauma to the head. Typical symptoms include: looking
          and feeling dazed and uncertain of what is happening, confu-  Role of Omega-3 in TBI Recovery
          sion, difficulty thinking clearly or responding appropriately to   Treatment for mild TBI (mTBI) is multifactorial. In addition to
          mental status questions, and being unable to describe events   brain rest and a gradual return to duty, Soldiers diagnosed with
                                                3
          immediately before or after the trauma event.”  While most   a mTBI after the attack began taking omega-3 fish oils. The
          of the Soldiers’ MACE2 scores were > 25, the sensitivity and   protocol consists of 9g fish oil a day for week 1, 6g of omega-3
          specificity of the cognitive test decrease significantly after 12   fish oils a day for week 2, and 3g of omega-3 fish oils daily for
          hours from the event.  Additionally, DoDI 6490.11 defines a   maintenance thereafter.  Though studies have primarily been
                                                                               4
                           3
          potentially concussive event as being, but not limited to, within   animal-based, omega-3 fish oils’ anti- inflammatory properties
          50 m of a blast. Not all Soldiers were within 50 m of a blast but   may assist in neuroprotection and regeneration postconcus-
                                                                 5
          still sustained symptoms consistent with an AOC. Therefore,   sion.  The use of omega-3s have a low risk for adverse reaction
          Soldiers were diagnosed with mild to moderate TBI if they fit   such as increased bleeding but may have a significant impact
          the criteria set forth by the CPG even though most of them had   on a patient’s long-term cognitive health. 6

          124  |  JSOM   Volume 21, Edition 3 / Fall 2021
   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131