Page 52 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Fall 2017

included mass casualty events, management of an expectant equipment and capability before deployment. Training could
casualty, a casualty with retained unexploded ordinance, and be performed at the ATTC. ATTC leaders came to evaluate
the treatment of an injured military working dog and its han- the 102nd FST’s experience to improve predeployment train-
dler, to name a few. Rehearsal should be maintained as a vi- ing for FSTs conducting future GHOST-T missions.
tal part of the deployment to maintain mission readiness and
competence, as well as provide rapid integration of the FST/ Conclusion
GHOST-T into the SOF team environment.
We report the experience of the 102nd FST during deployment
The GHOST-T concept, although still evolving, continues to to Afghanistan in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel/
support SOF and most likely will serve as a model in conflicts Resolute Support Mission, which provided small, ultramobile
for surgical teams. The limitations of our experience have been surgical teams supporting SOF teams conducting train, advise,
a lack of surgical patients; however, fewer personnel in the- and assist operations. Through the experience of FST and SOF
ater may not translate to the surgical caseload that previous team members, knowledge and resource gaps were identified
years of the war have experienced. Considerations for future and closed, and excellent care was provided during the de-
GHOST-T include mobilizing smaller elements than tradi- ployment. We offer suggestions for military medical planners
tional FSTs. If there are only two CRNAs, then, at most, one for similar teams based on accumulation of notes from after-
heavy or two light teams can be formed. This would dictate actions reports and improvements in equipment/instrument
deploying two surgical technicians, two medics, two practical sets, resuscitation capabilities, and rehearsals made during the
nurses, and two nurses, with the emergency room and inten- deployment.
sive care nurses possessing the appropriate skill set. The team
also does not require the administrative field medical assis- Disclaimer
tant that traditional FSTs have. This decreases the overall de- The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
ploying personnel from 20 to 15—a 25% manpower savings. reflect the official policy or position of 102nd Forward Surgi-
Other considerations are for more GHOST-T–specific train- cal Team, Martin Army Community Hospital, the U.S. Army
ing during predeployment training and familiarization with Institute of Surgical Research, San Antonio Military Medical
Center, the U.S. Army Medical Department, the U.S. Army Of-
fice of the Surgeon General, the Department of the Army, U.S.
Air Force Medical Department, the U.S. Air Force Office of
the Surgeon General, the Department of the Air Force, Depart-
ment of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Disclosures
The authors have nothing to disclose.

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