Page 117 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Winter 2016
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placed that drained 600mL of blood. Four fractured ribs   being isolated from the main element and to delayed ap-
              and subcutaneous emphysema were identified in initial   plication of treatments, specifically Hextend and TXA,
              radiographs, but no bullet was located. The casualty was   which subsequently stabilized the casualty. Our recom-
              then taken to the operating room for a laparotomy. No   mendation is that while engaged in a developing and un-
              injuries to the abdomen were identified. After surgery,   stable tactical situation in which the HLZ is not secured,
              the casualty remained intubated and stable for 2 days,   consider  delaying  MEDEVAC  requests  and  develop  a
              during which further imaging revealed the bullet lodged   casualty collection point pending all other attempts to
              in soft tissue in the vicinity of the L3 vertebral body. The   stabilize the casualty or significant change in the tactical
              casualty remained in hospital care for the next 2 weeks   environment.
              with few complications. He developed a climbing white
              blood cell count, fever, and worsening pleural effusion   Prolonged field care should be central to a medic’s provi-
              adjacent to the left lower lobe. A broad spectrum of an-  sion considerations, and mission parameters will dictate
              tibiotic treatment with meropenem, vancomycin, and   the load out between team members and “speed-ball”
              levofloxacin was initiated and his symptoms resolved.   air resupply feasibility in the field. The 18Ds possessed
              A number of pulmonary  embolisms were also  identi-  the supplies and ability to perform higher interventions
              fied. Three weeks after injury, he was discharged with   on this casualty prior to exfiltration. However, it is im-
              a prescription for rivaroxaban for his pulmonary em-  portant to weigh improving an individual casualty’s vi-
              bolisms and continued his recovery at home. Checkups   tal signs against the prospect of uncertain extraction or
              at 1 and 3 weeks after discharge revealed an unremark-  air resupply, further casualties in the immediate future,
              able postoperative course. The casualty complained of   and tapping into finite supplies. When exfiltration was
              mild discomfort on the affected side and some difficulty   accomplished 4 hours later, the casualty’s vital signs
              breathing when lying prone, but both of these symp-  were stable. The 18Ds did not transfuse (US) blood to
              toms diminished over time.                         the casualty, but having identified universal or type-spe-
                                                                 cific donors among the partner force prior to the mis-
                                                                 sion would have been an effective method for prolonged
              Discussion
                                                                 casualty hemostasis in lieu of MEDEVAC or air resup-
              Supportive care in casualty transport and management   ply of blood products. There is a need in this setting to
              for prevention of hypothermia proved crucial during   identify indicators for further resuscitation, such as se-
              this scenario of limited advanced treatment options. The   rum lactate, pulse oximetry, end tidal carbon dioxide, or
              ability of the partner force to provide these supportive   physiologic parameters to help medics preserve limited
              measures in addition to standard TCCC care allowed   resources such as blood products.
              the 18Ds to effect , safe casualty transport and increase
              the overall capabilities of the ODA by freeing up man-  References
              power. Prolonged field care situations many times tax
              the sole medical provider(s), and cross-training team   1.  Kelly JF, Ritenour AE, McLaughlin DF, et al. Injury severity
              members allows the medic to view the overall casualty   and causes of death from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Opera-
              assessment  and  develop  and  modify treatment  plans   tion Enduring Freedom: 2003–2004 vs 2006. J Trauma. 2008;
                                                                   64(suppl):S21–S27.
              rather than participating in work that can be delegated   2.  Kotwal RS, Montgomery HR, Kotwal BM, et al. Eliminating
              to people with less medical training.                preventable death on the battlefield.  Arch Surg. 2011;146:
                                                                   1350–1358.
              A tube thoracostomy was indicated by mechanism of   3.  Eastridge BJ, Mabry RL, Seguin P, et al. Death on the battlefield
              injury  and  physical  findings,  the casualty’s  difficulty   (2001–2011): implications for the future of combat casualty
                                                                   care. J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2012;73(suppl 5):S431–S437.
              breathing, and evidence of uncontrolled, internal hem-
              orrhage. However, the application of less invasive treat-
              ments  first  and  close  monitoring  eventually  suggested
              a field tube thoracostomy was unnecessary. Although a   SSG Barnhart is an 18D with B/2/19 Special Forces Group
              chest tube would have enabled the 18Ds to reclaim lost   (Airborne).
              blood and transfuse it to the casualty, using the field
              blood-transfusion kit, the casualty’s stable presentation   SSG Cullinan is an 18D with A/1/20 Special Forces Group
              led the medics  to suspend further  treatments pending   (Airborne).
              continued assessment and vital signs trending.     MAJ Pickett  is a practicing emergency physician and Bat-
                                                                 talion Surgeon for 2/19 Special Forces Group (Airborne). He
              Despite the casualty’s initial presentation as urgent sur-  is the director of the Center for Prehospital and Operational
              gical,  a  MEDEVAC  request  could  have  been  delayed.   Medicine at Wright State University Boonshoft School of
              This decision may have prevented developments in the   Medicine, Dayton, Ohio. E-mail: jrpickett@mac.com.
              tactical situation that led to the casualty and caregivers



              Extended Care of Casualty With Chest Trauma                                                    101
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