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predicates the disruption of social networks, interrupts eco- of dedicated academicians because tactical decisions require
nomic and educational opportunities, impedes healthcare timely assessment and prompt action to retain initiative on the
delivery, and destroys the built infrastructure. With substan- battlefield.
tive reports that Islamic State activity significantly dislocates
health capacity, including the loss of up to 90% of local phy- With this acknowledgment, however, the application of lin-
sicians, it is then perfectly acceptable to draw the conclusion ear regression arguably remains a better method for assessing
that these effects increase where the Islamic State is operating opportunities in humanitarian-oriented stability operations
in strength. Thus, it is rational to conclude that where the than does the previous trial-and error-approach that incurred
8
Islamic State is operating from an area of increased relative au- massive costs, delivered marginal public health outcomes, and
thority, they will elect to pursue more attacks as they attempt failed to support broader military objectives. Any endeavor
to achieve their military and political objectives. Such conclu- into humanitarian issues by military forces must not be ap-
sions and correlations may also have influence in areas such as proached with a cavalier attitude because the potential sec-
intelligence asset prioritization as the discovery of these rela- ond- and third-order effects of misguided forays could have
tionships is disseminated across the warfighting functions of a disastrous implications for at-risk populations. As with any
Special Operations Task Force staff. tool, the utility of linear regression lies in the skill of the
craftsman applying it; but with a proper understanding of the
limitations involved, it may facilitate the simultaneous goals
Summary and Conclusions
of mission success and improving the well-being of the pop-
Consistent with the common statistical idiom that all models ulations that Special Operations Forces Soldiers are morally
are wrong but that some models may be useful, the preceding obligated to protect.
approach to a complex problem in Iraq is constrained by sig-
nificant assumptions and limitations in data. To reiterate, the Author Contributions
correlation of variables does not equate to causation. Many The authors solely retrieved and analyzed the data and wrote
variables will covary with one another; while crime and ice the entirety of this article.
cream sales both increase in summer, neither is truly associated
with the other because warm weather acts as a confounder, Financial Disclosures
creating a spurious relationship. Conversely, the application The authors have no relevant financial relationships or con-
of statistical tools does not need to be the exclusive purview flicts of interest to disclose.

Disclaimer
The views and information presented herein are those of the
authors and do not represent the official position of the US
Army Special Operations Command, US Army Medical Com-
mand, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or
US Government.

References
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pdf
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