Page 102 - JSOM Winter 2019

An Ongoing Series

Measuring Special Operations Forces Readiness

1
1
Kevin Berry, MD ; Bonnie Sakallaris, PhD, RN ;
2
Patricia A. Deuster, PhD, MPH *

ABSTRACT
Special Operations Force (SOF) Operators, spouses, and com- or the growth/decay of personal capabilities and capacities.
ponent representatives were asked to describe what readiness Without empirical data, measuring readiness will continue to
looks like to them and what is needed to achieve it. Their views be elusive. Moreover, in the absence of improvement science,
informed a broad and deep dive into the academic and gray lit- or being able to demonstrate which improvement strategies
erature for believable measures relevant to operational readi- (e.g., policies, systems, metrics) actually work, innovation de-
ness. This commentary is a synthesis of that work and provides pends on chance and remains unsupported by existing infra-
recommendations for ways to improve “readying” strategies, structures. Ultimately this absence will either impede or stop
practices, and outcomes to better achieve human-based mis- the spread of potentially cost-effective approaches.
sion performance. The key modifiers of Operator readiness
are family, SOF culture and leadership, and time. Recommen- The public record does not reveal what SOF mission quan-
dations are to measure SOF mission performance to define titative and qualitative performance measures are collected.
premission Operator readiness; conceptualize mission readi- And neither does it indicate how and if Operator in-mission
ness in terms of assets and not just deficits; combine experi- performance data drive Operator readiness activities over re-
ential wisdom with that gained from the study of in- mission peated deployment cycles and over the career of Operators.
performance and premission readiness data; establish SOF Experienced SOF trainers assess candidates and select the next
phenotypes for use by all components; address emerging fields cadre of Operators. The public record provides evidence that
2
(doping, sleep, mental toughness, spiritual readiness, moral in- some data drive component’s selection decisions, but a survey
jury); and develop a simple readiness index. of the public record reveals little about what serial assessments
of perishable fitness data are collected and analyzed after se-
Keywords: family readiness; mission performance; Operator lection. This is also true of SOF course work. Moreover, the
readiness; POTFF; Special Operations Forces record does not reveal how readiness, as currently measured,
impacts individual or unit performance during actual mis-
sions. The components might or might not collect and analyze
pertinent data about inputs, costs, and outputs to drive greater
Introduction
effectiveness into their professional training programs. It is
Readiness, recorded in training and medical readiness records unclear whether point-in-time human readiness and resilience
and checklists, is necessary but not sufficient to ensure mission outcomes and outcome trajectories, which consider the phases
success. Honoring SOF truths—humans are more important of the deployment cycle, are consistently measured and used
than hardware; quality is better than quantity; SOFs cannot for actionable events. Personal cognitive, physical, and spiri-
be mass produced; and competent SOF cannot be created af- tual capabilities, if recorded, may not be tracked as elements
ter emergencies—requires detailed and actionable information of assigned or designed fitness necessary to build essential ca-
about individual SOF readiness and resilience. pabilities that enhance performance over a career.

Currently, granular and actionable data about SOF readiness Defining Ready for What and When
at the individual person level are elusive. The chaos and com-
1
plexity of military missions and on the home front are data The Joint Staff defines “readiness” as a national strategy and as
blind spots that prevent the systematic observation of what a milestone for units up next for deployment. Both definitions
factors within the nature of military service might be associ- address the importance of capabilities (ready for what) but
ated with evidence of the sufficiency of mission performance neither addresses the domains of readiness, timeliness (ready
*Correspondence to Dr Patricia Deuster, Consortium for Health and Military Performance, Department of Military and Emergency Medicine,
F Edward Hebert School of Medicine, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD or patricia.deuster@usuhs.edu
1 Drs Berry and Sakallaris are vice presidents at Thought Leadership & Innovation Foundation, McLean, VA. Dr Deuster is a professor and direc-
2
tor of the Consortium for Health and Military Performance: A Defense Center of Excellence, Department of Military and Emergency Medicine,
Uniformed Services University, Bethesda, MD.
100