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The Mosul Trauma Response


                                                    A Case Study

          Spiegel PB, Garber K, Kushner A, Wise P. The Mosul Trauma Response. A Case Study. The Johns Hopkins Center for
          Humanitarian Research; February 2018; 140 pages.
          Review by COL (Ret) Warner “Rocky” D. Farr, MD, MPH




             he Battle for Mosul was probably the largest urban war   •  Successful coordination among local leaders, partners,
          Tsiege conducted since World War II. Lasting from October   and civilian and military officials occurred, but field co­
          2016 to July 2017, Iraqi and Kurdish forces fought to retake   ordination could have been better resourced.
          Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, which had fallen to ISIL (Is­  •  Deconfliction from all these various new players could
          lamic State of Iraq and the Levant; a.k.a., Daesh) in 2014.   have been better.
          Backed by US­led coalition military forces, more than 940,000   •  What is the real take­home message from this study? It
          civilians fled during the siege. Thousands were injured while   is that battlefield  medicine can be outsourced,  privat­
          seeking safety from the fighting. It became                      ized, contracted, be not neutral or indepen­
          obvious early on that the Iraqi government                       dent, be embedded into combat formations,
          military forces did not have adequate, or­                       show up without all levels, roles, or eche­
          ganic, medical force structure or capacity                       lons of care and generally not meet the ex­
          to provide trauma care, despite the require­                     isting mold of medical support we all grew
          ments and obligations under several Ge­                          up with and expect in ground combat.
          neva Convention protocols to do just that.
          The World Health Organization (WHO)                              In  the report,  the authors  provide  a
          and its partners stepped in to fill this huge                    thoughtful list of recommendations, such
          and somewhat novel emerging gap, as did a                        as: “Accept a pluralism in the balancing
          number of contractors and other new 21st                         of humanitarian principles  among differ­
          century battlefield medical players.                             ent humanitarian  actors; medical  teams
                                                                           operating directly with a combatant force
          This marks the first time WHO has played                         should not be identified as humanitarian;
          the leading role in coordinating care in a                       frontline medical services could be provided
          large conventional wartime conflict and the                      by specialized groups explicitly trained to
          first time civilian trauma settings and ca­                      work directly with combatant forces, pos­
          pabilities were attempted by such medical                        sibly contracted as military support services
          players at the war’s frontlines.                                 focusing on providing frontline medi­
                                                                           cal services for both injured soldiers and
          Some of the key findings in the report The                       civilians.”
          Mosul Trauma Response. A Case Study, by Paul B. Spiegel and
          colleagues, are:                                   The authors also recommend the following:

            •  Between 1,500 and 1,800 lives, military and civilian, may   •  “Using private medical organizations to provide human­
               have been saved through this novel war trauma response.  itarian services in conflict settings needs further study.”
            •  By applying existing Western military standards of   •  “Humanitarian organizations must be extremely care­
               trauma care (not including the golden hour) and forward   ful to avoid being instrumentalized as part of a conflict
               deployment, WHO and its partners challenged existing   strategy by governments, militaries, and armed combat­
               humanitarian laws and custom principles, particularly   ants in the future.”
               those  of  the  complete  neutrality  and  independence  of   •  “Only organizations and professionals with conflict ex­
               nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs)  and  private   perience, international humanitarian law training, and
               voluntary organizations (PVOs). This is just yet one   a strong understanding of the high­risk environments
               more thing that fills today’s battlefield with contractors!  in which they will be working should be deployed near
            •  The Iraqi military did not have medical force capacity to   frontlines.”
               fulfill obligations to protect and care for wounded civilians
               on the Mosul battlefield, and the US­led coalition did not   This report not only gives one much to think about the evolv­
               provide substantial medical care for wounded civilians.  ing face of medical support in today’s changing battlefield
            •  WHO­supported field hospitals filled many important   but also completely fits in with the ongoing discussion of the
               gaps in trauma surgical care, while postoperative and   problems with the golden hour and its applicability. I can see
               rehabilitative care needed greater support.   completing medical contractors bidding now: “I can guarantee

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