Page 135 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Spring 2016
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that we could train on. We got a grant from the [US Army]   with the medics. Some captains, lieutenants, or platoon ser-
              Surgeon General to purchase some high-end simulators;   geants, they wanted their medic with them all the time; other
              we [at 3/75] took these and immersed [ourselves] inside a   ones said, “The hell with him; let’s keep him at the flagpole.
              shed that we could make brilliant light, zero light, or in the   He can read magazines and eat until we get an injury.” So
              middle. A guy would run 200m, breach two obstacles (agil-  some were integrated. So what we had to do was change
              ity, strength) then request permission to enter the simulation   that; it was too varied. So we developed the CRRL, the Ca-
              room, “Mike 03, coming in.” He would start working on the   sualty Response for Ranger Leaders. What we did was talk
              simulator. What we found was that we couldn’t just take a   about the expectations, limitations, and employment strate-
              guy and thrust him into that. We had to stop,  because guys   gies of your available assets.
              were killing the manikin constantly. We had to start from the
              ground up which was tabletop. Can you do these procedures   Hooah on.
              in ideal conditions? Can you do these procedures in less-  One  of  the  biggest  problems  we  had  was  that  we  med-
              than-ideal conditions (which would be on the ground with   ics had a different language than the tactical operator. We
              all your equipment on, working out of your aid bag or as-  spoke transient brain injury, tension pneumothorax, cardiac
              sault vest)? Can you do these things in low light, high noise?   tamponade; they don’t give a shit about that. You know what
              What’s feasible? What’s not? We started to find out a lot of   they speak? Cost-benefit analysis, added value, risk manage-
              different things like you can’t really do a venous cut-down.   ment. So what we had to do was change how we did things
              It’s very difficult to do a surgical [cricothyrotomy] without a   to get them involved. So we started this course and, again,
              tracheal hook to anteriorly displace the cricoid cartilage, and   expectations, limitations, and employment strategies of all
              make a draw bridge and open it up and put a tube in real   the assets you have available, but then how they are em-
              easy. We learned not only about the procedures we could   ployed on the battlefield. What their capabilities are, what
              and could not do, we learned about how to pack equipment   [medical] resources we have that are outside [the unit].
              so that it was optimal when you got there.
                                                                 And the second part of this is an interactive, scenario-driven
              The last thing we learned was that working in two-man buddy   event. And that really gets their attention. One I remember
              teams with guys that were trained the same; they comple-  was we picked out a lieutenant or a captain coming back to
              mented each other. Things went a lot faster versus the lone   the [Ranger] Regiment and he’s all motivated as shit: “Oh,
              medic by himself. And then what we did was we pumped   we got dressings that instantly clot blood, they got these
              that lead—because we videotaped all these—so your peers   platforms and litters and, man, this is great!” And then OK, I
              would watch you go through these high-end trauma clinics.   could just tell they just clicked it out of their brain, you know,
              And them seeing you make a mistake—because we were all   “Great, this is good stuff,” but it wasn’t really sticking.
              trained from the same core—for some reason, it resonated
              with them; they would not make the same mistakes going   So the second part of this thing was that I would pick one
              through the simulator themselves. We’d talk about it.  of them and say, “OK, now you are the Assault Team Leader
                                                                 for the initial breach. You’re going in on a MH-47 [modified
              From there, what happened was that there were three pro-  Chinook helicopter], you got 20 guys with you. You have two
              grams that were born out of this thing—the Ranger First Re-  breaches to make. If you cannot make both those breaches
              sponder Course, which focused on six critical tasks that had   in 35 minutes, you need to radio and [exfiltrate]. You will be
              a direct correlation with decreasing potentially preventable   picked up, cycled in and out on [MH-]60s [modified Black-
              death—those were owned by the individual warfighter be-  hawk helicopters], and, if you can make it, then the remainder
              cause, as we learned, the medic can’t be everywhere at the   of the assault force will be coming in and will utilize the pri-
              same time. And so the days of you kicking in the door and   mary and alternate breach to [infiltrate] . . . the target. Do you
              someone getting shot and lying in the doorway and yelling,   understand your mission? Right. OK, do you want everyone
              “Medic!” are over. Those days were over. So we changed the   to have their Bleeding Control Kit?” “Yes.” Ding-ding-ding-
              way he did business. Every guy carried a bleeding-control kit.  ding: the number would go up because the individual had
                                                                 the stuff in there to decrease about 70% to 80% of prevent-
              Then we had the medics be ready to assume operational   able deaths inside the bleeding-control kit, which had chest
              cycle. It was called Ranger Medic Assessment and Validation,   seals, needles for [pneumothorax] decompression, nasal pha-
              and they had to have book knowledge and hands-on experi-  ryngeal airway, and bleeding-control stuff—it was more than
              ence, go through an oral board, and they would be blessed   [just] a [bleeding-control kit]. “Do you want a Ranger Medic
              off to go to that [cycle].                         with you?” “Hell, yeah. I want the Ranger Medic.” Ding-ding-
                                                                 ding-ding: the number would go up. “Man, we’re close to
              And the last thing we found was that infantrymen go through   100%!” “So do you want to bring an extra medic who has two
              several pillars of education that are built around each other.   Pelican cases out of the 47 after we push the primary breach-
              Well, everywhere in there it was either they didn’t deal with   ing package off, so he converts that [aircraft] to a casevac
              medical at all or it was extremely subjective like, “Check with   platform? You want that?” “Um, oh, er, I want to bring extra
              Brigade Surgeon.” So we went back and interviewed warf-  shooters; can I do that?” “Sure.” “Here comes the 47.”
              ighters and leaders, and again we were able to confirm the
              hypothesis that everything was subjective. That was how he   It’s zero-moon 30 in the morning. Everybody’s standing up,
              based his relationship to the medical stuff on what his rela-  getting ready to exit the aircraft, taking a knee, unhitching,
              tionship was when he first came in the Army and had contact   to land and go conduct business. Next thing we know, [on



              Interview: Rob Miller on Changing Trauma Care                                                  119
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