Page 121 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Winter 2014

Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6490.03 cases, DoD response has been criticized as slow (e.g.,
mandates the implementation of environmental surveil- Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina). These ex-
lance to control or reduce occupational and environ- amples and the subsequent public backlash have moti-
mental health risks. Fortunately, none of the samples vated DoD leaders to improve the response time of Title
collected by 227 personnel (including air and water) 10 and Title 32 assets in support of relief operations.
10
were found to have contaminants at or above the US Here we presented the lessons learned by the 227th and
Public Health Command Technical Guide 230 military its command team during the unit’s rapid deployment
exposure guidelines. 9 in support of Superstorm Sandy relief operations. We
stressed the importance of training and planning for the
What may not be obvious is the fact that the 227th met unique requirements associated with deploying in sup-
with some resistance when the Commander proposed port of a contingency operation. We also highlighted
moving to Fort Hamilton to provide this support to the the importance of a proactive approach to identifying
task force. This highlights the sensitive political nature your unit’s specific mission requirements in the midst of
of such a mission, where the DoD leadership is reluc- the chaotic and politically charged environment that is
tant to expose Title 10 assets to close public scrutiny characteristic of DSCA and HADR operations involving
or where the public may not respond positively to the a great diversity of federal, state, and local authorities
presence of uniformed Soldiers operating in their neigh- along with nongovernmental organizations. In these cir-
borhoods. In fact, 227th Soldiers did experience some cumstances, time is most definitely the enemy, as such
hostility when local residents asked for help that the operations are, by their very nature, temporally com-
Soldiers were specifically forbidden to provide, such pressed and specific mission requirements must be met
as entering their homes to remove damaged household in short order. While this is not unique to DSCA and
items. So it is understandable that the JCE was reluctant HADR missions, we argue that it is always true for these
to expose the Soldiers (whether they were organic to the catastrophic disaster response and humanitarian aid
JCE or those TACON or OPCON to the JCE for this missions. The window of opportunity for DoD assets to
mission) to this public scrutiny or unwanted attention. be useful in such circumstances will always be small and
It was only by clearly communicating the importance units allocated to DSCA or SWRF PTDO missions need
of the preventive medicine mission in this context, and to understand this and train to meet these requirements
supporting this assertion with the appropriate doctrine despite the relatively low likelihood of being deployed.
(e.g., DoDI 6490, Joint Staff Memorandum MCM-
0028-07; Joint Publication 4-02; and Army Regulation Disclosures
11-35) and the concurrence of senior ranking preventive
medicine personnel (e.g., Senior Army North preventive The authors have nothing to disclose.
medicine personnel), that we were able to successfully
expand our mission set to include this important piece. References
It is worth pointing out the significance of this event, 1. US Department of the Army. FM 3-0, Operations. Wash-
where the 227th became (and remained) the only Title ington, DC: Government Printing Office; February 2008.
10 medical asset involved in Superstorm Sandy relief op- 2. Department of Defense. Sustaining U.S. global leadership:
erations to conduct missions outside of DoD property. priorities for the 21st century defense. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office; January 2012.
3. Air Force Manual 24-204. Preparing hazardous materials
Summary for military air shipments. Washington, DC: Department of
As MG Russell Czerw eloquently and succinctly put the Air Force; 3 December 2013.
it, the contributions of preventive medicine are often 4. Air Force Manual A13.4.2.5.1.
5. Breidenbaugh M, Haagsma K. The US Air Force Spray
not recognized as such following successful military Unit: a history of large area disease vector control opera-
campaigns, but the absence of effective measures are tions, WWII through Katrina. US Army Med Dep J. 2008;
immediately apparent for all the wrong reasons. This April–June:54–61.
9
highlights the importance of providing appropriate 6. Armed Forces Pest Management Board. Technical Guide
preventive medicine support to all military missions, No. 24. Contingency Pest Management Guide. Silver
including DSCA and HADR missions, even when the Spring, MD; Armed Forces Pest Management Board, In-
importance of preventive medicine is not fully appreci- stallation Services Division, U.S. Army Garrision; 2012.
ated by the operational units making up the bulk of the 7. Weese C. Health implications of occupational environmental
Title 10 response elements. health sampling. Army Med Depy J. 2008;April–June:74–80.
8. Miller R, W Roberts. Environmental Health. In Kelley P.
In recent decades, the DoD has been called on to sup- ed. Military Preventive Medicine: Mobilization and De-
ployment. Vol 1. Washington, DC: Department of the
port disaster relief operations on a large scale. In certain
Army, Office of the Surgeon General; 2003:417–468.

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