Page 138 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Summer 2015
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During the operational advocacy phase, a senior critical   Abou Yahaha, and Lt Col Seydou Toure) and several
          member expressed reservations because he was unclear   subject matter experts (SMEs) invested 40-plus hours
          as to the official authorization to proceed. The SOFLE   to drafting policy and vital documents that would drive
          representative immediately engaged with Niger national   ownership and facilitate proficiency, reliability, and sus-
          military contacts, and within 48 hours of the mention of   tainability. Consultations via e-mail when the military
          the reservation of support in our daily SITREP, the hesi-  training team was not in country were also notable as a
          tant senior member reported having proper approvals.   metric of commitment and involvement.

          RAND Metric 3: Development of                      RAND Metric 6: Level of success in
          hedging (fallback) options                         recruiting trainees and conducting training
          Program Metric 3: Expectation management offers the   Program Metric 6: Niger was extremely successful in re-
          best hedging option. Making it clear that this will not   cruiting trainees for the direct training and allocating space
          be equivalent to a US evacuation system but will be suf-  and even providing food for trainees. During the working
          ficient for US emergent needs was critical. Additionally,   group, the operational leaders allocated training slots to
          adhering to the commander’s intent and mission guid-  relevant units and issued orders for 30 initial personnel
          ance was key in discussions with the partner nation.   to be tagged for the program ( CASEVAC crew). One pro-
          Allowing the host nation to understand the basic re-  gram metric was the percentage of  individuals who had
          quirements and offer their own plans to meet the intent   attended previous block(s) of training. On average, 86%
          meant that the host could also develop hedging options.   of the students returned and continued the program. For
          Program Metric 3 includes three hedging premises: (1)   those who did not continue, the leadership provided justi-
          Develop four teams with the advanced medical skills to   fication for why the person was pulled out of the program.
          permit them to fly onboard any aircraft as medical at-  Another program metric was the number of students who
          tendants; (2) develop 10 medical crews that could be   were trained by those who were originally trained by the
          informally tasked as needed; and (3) develop a national   military training team (MTT). The individuals trained by
          casualty evacuation system. These options were devel-  the MTT went on to train 295 individuals (indirect train-
          oped in consultation with the Niger operational work-  ees to the program) as of February 2014.
          ing group and acknowledge the range of outcomes that
          would be acceptable.
                                                             RAND Metric 7: Level of partner performance
                                                             Program Metric 7: Partner level of performance was
          RAND Metric 4: Level of resource adequacy          high at the individual and organizational level. Anec-
          to execute effort
                                                             dotally, the MTT instructors reported a high degree of
          Program Metric 4: From an overall program perspective,   enthusiasm and effort on the part of the partner nation
          the level of resources were sufficient. However, at the tac-  students. However, the level of performance in some ar-
          tical level, there were concerns based on the stipulation   eas was lower than desired in regard to training addi-
          that the US military training team was to remain as con-  tional personnel (indirect trainees) when the MTT was
          sistent as possible. Ensuring that the team composition   not in country. The program metric was for the partner
          remained steady became a metric from mission to mis-  nation to conduct nine training sessions with indirect
          sion. Another resource adequacy measure was the avail-  students in our absence. The Niger CASEVAC crew
          ability of airframes to complete the course of instruction   members only held five classes during the designated
          on the designed timeline. Committing the aircraft from   time frames; this might be attributed to the short time
          the limited fleet of two available Cessna aircraft to train-  line in between missions. The intent of this metric was to
          ing came at an opportunity cost for the host nation. But   drive greater proficiency and experience of the primary
          they provided the aircraft 95% of the time requested.   CASEVAC crewmembers in the advanced skills and de-
                                                             livery of training. Another performance-level program
                                                             metric was the signing of an official policy document
          RAND Metric 5: Adequacy of contact points and      that created the capacity formally within the military.
          regular consultations
                                                             The US expectation for this performance item was not
          Program Metric 5: A key concern was whether the appro-  realistic at first and required multiple consultations to
          priate operational leaders would be available. To achieve   confirm progress toward the goal was being made and
          the primary program objective of partner ownership of   to adjust the expectation that a policy document that
          a national program, operational leaders were needed to   reorganized aspects of the Niger military and created
          design the Niger program and create a national policy.   a whole new division could be done in merely 3 to 6
          Over the course of the program and  numerous missions,   months. The policy documented was completed in April
          the  operational  leadership  (Col  Boubacar  Bako,  Col   2015 (an expedited 8 months).



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