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Just as the United States has hundreds of trauma centers and   Berwick D, Downey A, Cornett E, eds. A National Trauma Care Sys-
            thousands  of  autonomous  prehospital  care systems,  which   tem: Integrating Military and Civilian Trauma Systems to Achieve
            can potentially slow the transition of advances in military pre-  Zero Preventable Deaths After Injury. National Academies of Sci-
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            ant Commands, the US Special Operations Command and   Bottoms M. Tactical Combat Casualty Care—Saving lives on the bat-
            the US Transportation Command, all of which play a role in   tlefield. Tip of the Spear (Command Publication of the US Special
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                                                               mander, US Special Operations Command letter, 9 March 2005.
            bat casualty care unless directives are issued at the highest   Butler FK. Two decades of saving lives on the battlefield: tactical com-
            level of the military chain of command, which is the Secretary   bat casualty care turns 20. Mil Med. 2017;182 (3):e1563–e1568.
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            medical advisor, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health   Butler FK. Leadership Lessons Learned in Tactical Combat Casualty
            Affairs. Lacking direction in the form of SecDef rule and Joint   Care. J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2017;82(6S Suppl 1):S16-S25. doi:
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          Unfortunately, at the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint   Butler FK, Smith DJ, Carmona RH. Implementing and preserving ad-
          Staff, and Service leadership levels, the span of responsibilities is   vances in combat casualty care from Iraq and Afghanistan through-
                                                               out the US military. J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2015;79(2):321–326.
          immense and the ability of leaders at this level to focus on and   doi:10.1097/TA.0000000000000745
          mandate aspects specific aspects of trauma care is limited. There-  Butler FK Jr, Holcomb JB. The tactical combat casualty care transition
          fore, to date, when change is effected in battlefield trauma care, it   initiative.  U.S.  Army Medical Department Journal. 2005;April–
          typically first occurs at lower levels in the military chain of com-  June:33–37.
          mand and benefits only those individuals in that part of the orga-  Butler FK Jr, Hagmann J, Butler EG. Tactical Combat Casualty Care in
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          contained in the TCCC Guidelines were presented to a great many   Eastridge  BJ, Mabry RL, Seguin P, et  al. Death  on the  battlefield
          people in both civilian and military medical audiences. Even so,   (2001–2011): implications  for the future  of combat casualty
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          very little happened until Rear Admiral Tom Richards, then the   doi:10.1097/TA.0b013e3182755dcc
          Commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command, examined   Dickey N, Jenkins D. Combat Trauma Lessons Learned from Military
          the evidence presented to him and mandated the use of TCCC   Operations of 2001-2013. Defense Health Board Report; March
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          dreds of lives among U.S. combat casualties (Butler 2017 – TCCC   U.S. Special Operations Forces in the global war on terrorism:
          Turns 20, Butler 2017 – Beginnings, Butler 2017 – TCCC LLL).  2001–2004. Ann Surg. 2007;245(6):986–991. doi:10.1097/01.sla.
          A similar occurrence took place in the 75th Ranger Regiment. In   0000259433.03754.98
          1997, the regiment’s commander, then-COL Stanley McChrystal,   Holcomb JB, Stansbury LG, Champion HR, Wade C, Bellamy RF.
                                                               Understanding combat casualty care statistics. J Trauma. 2006;60
          acting on the advice of his Ranger medical personnel, made caring   (2):397–401. doi:10.1097/01.ta.0000203581.75241.f1
          for Rangers wounded in combat one of his “Big Four” priorities   Jacobs LM Jr; Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to Enhance
          by directive in 1997. The “Big Four” were: marksmanship, physi-  Survivability From Intentional Mass Casualty Shooting Events.
          cal training, small unit tactics, and . . . medical readiness (Kotwal   The Hartford Consensus IV: a call for increased national resilience.
          2011). COL McChrystal understood that on the field of battle,   Conn Med. 2016;80(4):239–244.
          everyone has the potential to be a casualty, and everyone—not just   Kelly JF, Ritenour AE, McLaughlin DF, et al. Injury severity and causes
          medics—may be the first to encounter a casualty and to render   of death from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
          lifesaving care. He expected that every Ranger was going to be   Freedom: 2003–2004 versus 2006. J Trauma. 2008;64(2 Suppl):
          engaged in casualty care if needed, and so every Ranger received   S21–S27. doi:10.1097/TA.0b013e318160b9fb
          training in TCCC (Butler 2017 – TCCC LLL, Kotwal 2017).  Kotwal RS, Montgomery HR, Miles EA, Conklin CC, Hall MT,
                                                                 McChrystal SA. Leadership and a casualty response system for elim-
          Likewise, General Doug Brown and Vice Admiral Eric Olson at   inating preventable death. J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2017;82(6S
          the U.S. Special Operations Command mandated TCCC at a time   Suppl 1):S9–S15. doi:10.1097/TA.0000000000001428
          when it was not the standard of care for prehospital trauma care,   Kotwal RS, Montgomery HR, Kotwal BM, et al. Eliminating prevent-
          either in the U.S. military or in the civilian sector. General John   able death on the battlefield. Arch Surg. 2011;146(12):1350–1358.
          Abizaid at the U.S. Central Command did much the same thing in   doi:10.1001/archsurg.2011.213
          requiring the use of tourniquets and hemostatic dressings in Iraq   Kragh JF Jr, Walters TJ, Westmoreland T, et al. Tragedy into drama: an
          and Afghanistan at a time when conventional wisdom dictated   american history of tourniquet use in the current war. J Spec Oper
          otherwise. It is apparent from this discussion that new evidence   Med. 2013;13(3):5–25. doi:10.55460/QN66-A9MG
          alone does not drive advances in trauma—in either the civilian   Kragh JF Jr, Walters TJ, Baer DG, et al. Survival with emergency tour-
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                                                               249(1):1–7. doi:10.1097/SLA.0b013e31818842ba
          Effecting  positive  change  in  trauma  care  therefore  takes  strong   Kragh JF Jr, Walters TJ, Baer DG, et al. Practical use of emergency
          senior leaders—acting on the advice of well-informed trauma sub-  tourniquets to stop bleeding in major limb trauma.  J Trauma.
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          required  implement  these  changes  (Butler  2017  –  TCCC  LLC,   survival on the battlefield.  Mil Med. 2014;179(5):477–482. doi:
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