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high threat environments. The concept of TEMS teams   mob. As the police response increased, the non–riot-
          of tactically trained paramedics under the operational   trained officers found themselves trying to protect and
          control of the SWAT team commander is an innova-   evacuate the bus driver, timekeeper, initial responding
          tive operational concept that answers the question of   paramedics,  and  themselves  from  an advancing  mob.
          how to deliver prehospital care in a tactical, hostile, or   Vehicles were torched and the police had to move from
          direct-threat environment. It allows lifesaving medical   the initial incident area to a safer perimeter (Figures 3
          interventions to be initiated at the point of wounding   to 6). Maintaining the perimeter to contain the riot was
          by medical providers, rather than delaying medical care   essential while additional law enforcement support ar-
          interventions until victims are evacuated to a triage area   rived. During the riot, as officer injuries were sustained,
          that is considered to be outside the perimeter in a “cold   additional officers  were removed from  riot control to
          zone” of tactical operations.                      evacuate the injured to a cold zone where EMS waited.

          In the case of the Little India Riot, the  riot situation   At this point, the concepts of tactical medicine for pre-
          was fluid. A number of different circumstances all oc-  hospital providers have not yet reached maturity in
          curred during this riot that increased the severity of the   Singapore. Therefore, prehospital medical care for this
          riot. The initial paramedic response arrived nearly si-  incident was limited by the standard scene safety re-
          multaneously with the street level patrol officers from   quirement limiting paramedic involvement to the cold
          the SPF. As the paramedics tried to deal with the injury,   zone. In this incident, establishing the initial casualty
          the crowd, many of whom had been drinking, increased   collection point (CCP) outside the perimeter in the cold
          in number on this hot and humid night. With the death   zone could have resulted in a possible delay of treat-
          of the casualty, the crowd became agitated, rapidly over-  ment initiation. In retrospect, prior training in tactical
          whelming the ability of the non–riot-trained patrol of-  medicine would have enabled the paramedics to manage
          ficers to deal with the increasingly angry and riotous   the casualties in the warm zone, thus freeing up officers


          Figures 3–6  The Little India Riot.



















          Source: asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/12/09/stop-and-  Source: therealsingapore.com/content/i-could-have-stopped-riot.
          think-lessons-from-little-india/. Eddy Blaxell.




















                                                             Source: helenang.wordpress.com/2013/12/09/breaking-news-deaths-
          Source: gmstore.wordpress.com/2013/12/09/riot-in-singapore-2013/.  reported-in-singapore-riots/.



          62                                   Journal of Special Operations Medicine  Volume 14, Edition 2/Summer 2014
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