Page 112 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Spring 2014

Behind the Lines:
A Critical Survey of Special Operations in World War II

Michael F. Dilley. Casemate; 2013. Hardcover: 280 pages.
ISBN: 978-1-612001-83-8. eIBN: 978-1-612001-84-5.

Review by R. Alan Hester

nder clear night skies of 27 February 1942, men He begins by establishing what constitutes “special pur-
Ufrom C Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion, turned- pose, special mission” organizations and the criteria he
up mugs full of tea and rum before boarding planes to used for critiquing these missions. This is helpful, for it
conduct Operation Biting. Their might be confusing if terms and nomenclatures were not
mission was clear: conduct a raid established from the beginning. His criteria for critiques
behind enemy lines to steal a Ger- are based on his judgment, experience, and two pub-
man Wurzburg Antenna (code- lished works that establish paradigms for surveying the
name “Henry”) so the British use of Special Operations Forces. Dilley uses Lucien S.
could gain a better understand- Vandenbroucke’s Perilous Options: Special Operations
ing of German radar technology. as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy to identify failed
The men endured bitter cold and operations and summarizes his criteria as follows:
anti-aircraft fire as they crossed
the English Channel en route to • Inadequate intelligence, including of the objective
Bruneval, France. Two hours and enemy forces defending it.
passed before the men received • Poor coordination, including lack of compatible
the signal to take their places. As they neared the drop equipment; getting one agency or service to be fully
zone flying at 500 feet, the lead plane’s light turned alert and responsive to the needs of another; diffi-
green, and the men exited the plane—over the wrong culties by planners in understanding one another’s
drop zone. After the men assembled on the ground and standard operating procedures; and outright con-
recovered their equipment, they moved toward their tar- fusion and mutual mistrust.
get undetected. MAJ Frost, C Company Commander, • Provision of faulty information to the national
approached the front door of the target building and was leadership, including deliberately misleading infor-
so surprised to find it unlocked, he almost forgot to blow mation of one-sided information.
the whistle to initiate the raid. Was the mission a success? • Wishful thinking, including missions designed or
Did it contribute to the larger strategic and operational evaluated on the assumption that had a limited ba-
mission? Was the risk of resources worth it? These are sis in fact; rejecting information that runs counter
the questions Michael F. Dilley attempts to answer in Be- to the hopes for success by the planners or decision
hind the Lines: A Critical Survey of Special Operations makers; and the blind desire to see a proposed mis-
in World War II. sion proceed and succeed.
• In appropriate intervention in mission execution,
The work is composed of short vignettes that have been including by higher military headquarters or the
mostly reworked from previous articles that explore national leadership. This is a factor I label as “the
missions in World War II conducted by “special pur- President as squad leader.”
pose, special mission units.” The diversity of the mis-
sions is only rivaled by the diversity of the countries Conversely, the author summarizes William H. McRa-
from which these units hail. He highlights missions that ven’s Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations War-
might be new ground to general readers and historians fare: Theory and Practice criteria for a successful special
alike. The author, however, goes beyond simple retelling operation as follows:
of missions. He examines what did and did not work, as Planning phase:
well as successes and failures of the missions as viewed • Simplicity: limiting the number of objectives; good
through his lens: predefined parameters set forth in the intelligence; and innovation.
first chapter, which are useful for comparing differ-
ent types of missions and garnering lessons for future Preparation phase:
operations. More important, he is imploring planners • Security: preventing the enemy from gaining an ad-
and commanders to evaluate the use of Special Opera- vantage through foreknowledge of the mission by
tions units by finding analogies in the past. concealing the timing and means of insertion.

104 Journal of Special Operations Medicine Volume 14, Edition 1/Spring 2014