Page 149 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Winter 2014

Why Civil Resistance Works:
The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict

Chenoweth, Erica, and Stephan, Maria J. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic
of Nonviolent Conflict. West Sussex, England: Columbia University Press; 2011.
Paperback, 320 pages, 11 figures, 19 tables. ISBN: 978-0-231-15683-7. $22.00/£15.00.

Review by COL (Ret) Warner “Rocky” D. Farr, MD, MPH

s violence always the most effective way of waging a political list of nonviolent campaigns in the back of this book. This dis-
Istruggle? Do opposition movements choose violence because connection demonstrates something, most probably my lack
it is inherently more effective than the alternative nonviolent of knowledge!
strategies to achieve their chosen policy
goals? I was reading an article in Foreign So, why does nonviolence work more often? The authors
Policy magazine recently concerning the postulate that a commitment to nonviolence enhances both
Ukraine. It postulated that the way ahead the domestic and the international legitimacy of movements
for the Ukrainians was to use nonviolent and encourages a broader-based participation in the resistance
resistance against the Russians. It further movement, which then causes increased pressure on the tar-
stated that “evidence shows that nonvio- geted regime. In addition, targeted regimes find it harder to
lent resistance is roughly twice as effec- oppress nonviolent movements and any attempts at repression
tive as armed conflict in routing dictators tend to backfire more often. Nonviolent movements are per-
and ending foreign occupations.” Such a ceived as less extreme and therefor have an enhanced appeal,
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broad statement raised the eyebrows of which facilitates their extraction of concessions in bargaining
this Special Forces Soldier and I chased down the reference. It with the regime. A regime is 12 times more likely to grant lim-
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was first an article (its case study being East Timor) and then ited concessions to a nonviolent opposition versus to a violent
it became a book—hence, now it is a book review. How do opposition. In addition, regime members such as civil servants,
nonviolent oppositions compare with violent resistance move- security forces, and the judiciary seem more likely to shift al-
ments in their ability to remove a regime or in achieving seces- legiance to nonviolent opposition groups than to outwardly
sion? Does it succeed more often and does it result in easier violent opposition alternatives. If resistance movements are
transitions to democracy? Is it cheaper, better, easier? threatening regime members with violence, then they do not
become attractive choices for turncoats to consider. There is a
This book looks at the success of nonviolent resistance cam- bit of advanced mathematics in this study, and one regression
paigns by the use of selected case studies. The featured studies analysis shows that nonviolent movements have a statistically
include the Iranian Revolution, 1977–1979, the First Pales- significantly higher percentage of population participation
tinian Intifada, 1987–1992, the Philippine People Power than violent movements. These authors make a very good case
Movement, 1983–1986, and the failed Burmese Uprising, challenging the conventional wisdom that a resistance move-
1988–1990. The authors develop a penetrating analysis of the ment, being weaker, must always resort to the use of force
conditions under which nonviolent resistances succeed or fail. against the stronger regime in power. Think of it as another
This volume shows that the traditional scholarly emphasis on tool in your toolbox.
only forceful approaches has ignored the ability of nonviolent
movements to often better mobilize supporters, better resist
regime crackdowns, better develop innovative resistant tech- References
niques, and in other ways take on and defeat repressive re- 1. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/10/how
gimes and then frequently to build durable democracies.
_to_beat_russian_occupation_non_violent_ukraine
_flash_mob?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email
The analysis in this book is quite rigorous and well docu- &utm_term=%2AMorning%20Brief&utm_campaign
mented. The lists of movements and the authors’ conclusions =MB.04.11.2014.
should have profound implications for anyone seeking to un- 2. Stephan MJ, Chenoweth E. Why civil resistance works.
derstand such movements. The authors evaluated 323 violent
and nonviolent campaigns occurring between 1900 and 2006. Int Security. 2008;33:7–44. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard
They found that the nonviolent campaigns succeeded 53% of .edu/files/IS3301_pp007-044_Stephan_Chenoweth.pdf.
the time, while only 27% of the armed struggles ultimately 3. Boot M. Invisible armies: an epic history of guerrilla war-
succeeded. This went for the entire spectrum of severity of re- fare from ancient times to the present. New York, NY: Liv-
pressive regimes and for all regions of the world. It is interest- eright; 2013.
ing that Max Boot’s book “Invisible Armies” and Asprey’s 4. Asprey RB. War in the shadows: the guerrilla in history. Two
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classic work “War in the Shadows” both have lists of insur- thousand years of the guerrilla at war from Ancient Persia
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rections and these lists DO NOT overlap very much with the to the present. New York, NY: William Morrow; 1994.

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