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As is the case with the majority of the POW camps im-  enemy prisoners without incident. Not only was this a
          mortalized in the historical record, the conditions at the   task they were not properly trained to execute but also
          Hanoi Hilton were deplorable. Not only were the ap-  a task that their nonhabitual higher chain of command
          proximately 300 prisoners subjected to miserable sanitary   was not trained to supervise. While I do not condone the
          conditions and regular bouts of tropical disease, there is   actions of the 372nd MP Company, it is likely inevitable
          significant evidence that the prisoners at the Hanoi Hilton   that a scandal of this nature would occur considering
          were systematically abused both physically and psycho-  the circumstances and the power of human nature. 17
          logically. The Vietnamese government still denies this
                 15
          and the US government failed to ever take any action, as   Enemy prisoners  are an inextricable  facet of warfare.
          none of the Vietnamese officials implicated in the abuse   Acknowledgment of this fact is critical if ever a conflict
          has ever been formally charged by either the United States   is to be entered into with the hope of avoiding a legacy
          or its allies, nor has extradition ever been demanded.    of tales comparable to those from the HMS Jersey to
                                                         15
          The information regarding the abuse was first revealed in   Abu Ghraib. In 2005, Senator John McCain proposed
          the late 1960s, when prisoners began to be released, but   a constitutional amendment that would ban the military
          was not made available to the general public for fear that   and government agencies from engaging in “cruel, in-
          retaliation would be inflicted on those still in captivity.   human or degrading treatment” of detainees,  because,
                                                                                                    18
          It is widely known by the American public and much of   apparently, the Geneva Convention does not do that al-
          the world that American prisoners were tortured in Viet-  ready. While I support Senator McCain’s efforts to en-
          namese prison camps; however, the fact that little if any   sure that what happened to him should never happen to
          action was taken or even threatened against the govern-  anyone else, especially at the hands of Americans, I sub-
          ment responsible for that torture left the status of POWs   mit that if proper planning for the handling of POWs
          in future wars potentially uncertain. 14           in wartime is executed and the mission tasked to those
                                                             who are trained to fulfill it, the horrific stories of POW
                                                             camps past will truly be history.
          The Global War on Terrorism
          After the shock of September 11, 2001, the US govern-
          ment vowed that the victims of that day would not have   Disclosures
          died in vain. Over the next 18 months, two very differ-  The definition and use of the term “prisoner of war” or
          ent fights were initiated in Afghanistan and Iraq as part   enemy prisoner of war after 1949 are specifically outlined
          of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While many   in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Convention (III) Rel-
          problems related to the GWOT have been excruciatingly   ative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Terrorists do
          dissected by people around the globe, there is no arguing   not meet the requirements of this convention and are thus
          the fact that the incidents that took place at Iraq’s Abu   referred to as “unlawful enemy combatants/detainees.”
          Ghraib prison facility (although realistically not compa-  Those captured in Iraq after the official cessation of the
          rable to stories of prison camps past) put an indelible   war are referred to as “civilian internees/detainees.” 19
          black mark on US efforts in Iraq and that a lack of plan-
          ning for handling POWs was partly responsible.
                                                             References
          In late 2002, LTG Richard Cody directed a bottom-  1.  Principal Films. History Sunday: POWs of the American Rev-
          up review of the Military Police (MP) Corps structure,   olution [DVD]. History Channel Documentary DVD AAE-
          largely as a means of making it better suited to handle   44269. New York, NY: A&E Television Networks; 2006.
          the internment/resettlement (I/R) mission.  This indi-  2.  Boatner MM III. Encyclopedia of the American Revolution.
                                               16
          cates the likelihood that someone recognized the poten-  New York, NY: McKay Publishers; 1974.
          tial for a POW situation to develop in the pending war   3.  Catton B. The American Heritage picture history of the Civil
                                                               War. New York, NY: American Heritage Publishing Company
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          foresight did not change the fact that although limited   4.  Eicher D. The longest night a military history of the Civil War.
          at the time, the I/R assets of the MP Corps that did exist   New York, NY: Simon & Schuster; 2001.
          may have had a positive impact on the detainee  situation   5.  Northern Light Productions.  The horrors at Andersonville
          in Iraq and, in fact, may have alleviated the Abu Ghraib   Prison: the trial of Henry Wirz [DVD]. History Channel Civil
                                                               War Series Documentary DVD AAE-73334. New York, NY:
          scandal entirely had they been involved early in the con-  A&E Television Networks; 2003.
          flict. Instead, the potential for a significant POW situ-  6.  Burnham P. The Andersonvilles of the North. In: Cowley R,
          ation was underestimated; the power of human nature   Conger E, eds.  With my face to the enemy: perspectives on
          was once again denied or, at best, misunderstood; and   the Civil War. New York, NY: The Berkley Publishing Group;
                                                               2001.
          MPs whose fellow Soldiers were simultaneously threat-  7.  Eighty Acres of Hell [DVD].  The History Channel; 2006.
          ened on the streets around Baghdad daily were expected   Available at:  http://shop.history.com/detail.php?p=69494&v
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