Page 81 - Journal of Special Operations Medicine - Summer 2014

The medical detachment probably possessed a variety Evacuation
of other drugs in addition to the medications listed on
their TO&E. The battalion’s radio transmission records As mentioned before, the 6th Rangers had no regimental
note requests from the rifles companies for additional clearing or collecting company to collect the battalion’s
medications apart from the battalion’s TO&E (meta- casualties. Wounded soldiers of the battalion were gen-
phen ointment, mercresin, zinc oxide ointment, quinine erally evacuated directly to the nearest hospital, most
8,17
sulfate, and “worm medicine”) 23,24 Metaphen ointment frequently either the 92nd EH, or the 10th PSH.
(also known as nitromersal) and mercresin ointment The 92nd EH was typically located near the 6th Army
were both mercury-derived topical antimicrobials that headquarters. Following the Philippine invasion, the
were reportedly useful for control of some superficial 6th Ranger headquarters was often colocated with 6th
skin infections, but may also have been used as a sur- Army headquarters so it is within reason that many of
gical disinfectant. 25,26 Similar mercury-containing com- the battalion’s casualties were received by the 92nd EH.
pounds are noted on the battalion’s base drug listing and The 10th PSH made the landing on Homonhan Island
were likely used as topical disinfectants as well. Quinine with the Rangers during the invasion of the Philippines.
sulfate was used as a malaria suppressive/prophylaxis It appears that the 10th PSH was placed under opera-
™
agent similar to Atabrine , and the requested “worm tional control of Ranger headquarters for the invasion.
medicine” is presumed to be treatment for the para- The hospital was specifically tasked in battalion opera-
sitic intestinal nematodes that are endemic to tropical tions orders for the invasion to land with the Ranger
regions. Additionally, one drug used by the battalion headquarters element, to set up the hospital on the
appears in the records unexpectedly. During planning beach, and begin receiving casualties within 3 hours of
8
for the Cabanatuan operation, the battalion medical landing.
and command elements foresaw that the Rangers would
be nearly exhausted following the raid. They planned As was typical of other U.S. Army infantry battalions of
for the administration of Benzedrine (Smith, Kline and that time, no vehicles on the battalion’s TO&E were des-
™
French, now GlaxoSmithKline, http://www.gsk.com/), ignated as dedicated evacuation vehicles or ambulances.
a mixture of amphetamine stimulants more commonly Fellow Rangers and litter bearers were expected to hand
known as “bennies” or “speed,” to all the Rangers in carry wounded men back to the battalion aid station.
the column, “to give us that last needed bit of energy.” 10 From there, it is possible that ambulances could have
been requested from one of the hospitals for evacuation
from the aid station. This was shown during the Caba-
Methods of resupplying Rangers in the field with ad-
equate medical supplies are not completely clear. The natuan operation when ambulances from the 92nd EH
radio transmission records show that the rifle com- were requested for transport of wounded and injured
panies occasionally requested medicines and supplies liberated prisoners once they had been withdrawn to a
when they were detached from 6th Ranger headquar- secure area. In contrast, the nature of assault landings
ters. During January 1945, when Company B was was such that the assaulting elements did not initially
27
detached for an operation on Santiago Island off the land with vehicles. Vehicles such as ambulances would
western coast of the Luzon Island, the request for resup- not be brought ashore until a foothold had been se-
ply was forwarded from battalion headquarters to the cured. This was evidenced during the Homonhan Island
medical detachment, which then gathered the necessary invasion when the 10th PSH was attached to Ranger
supplies. Dr. Fisher and a few accompanying aidmen headquarters.
28
carried the supplies to the detached Ranger company.
Although the radio transmission records did not specify During the Cabanatuan operation, the Rangers also made
it, Dr. Fisher may have personally taken the supplies to heavy use of a sympathetic local populace to assist with
the detached company so that he could observe the liv- the evacuation of the sick and injured prisoners. Prior to
ing conditions of the unit and see firsthand the medical the execution of the raid, the Rangers coordinated with
status of the soldiers. There is no indication of how the locals for the use of carabao carts for the evacuation of
battalion received its medical supplies, as there are no the most severely ill or wounded. Locals staged roughly
entries in the records of requests for supplies from the 25 carabao carts about 2 miles away from the camp,
1
battalion’s medical detachment to a higher headquar- near the south bank of the Pampanga River. In order to
ters. Since the Ranger battalion reported directly to the reach these assets, however, those prisoners who were
6th Army headquarters, the medical detachment may unable to walk independently were carried on Rang-
have requested supplies directly from the 6th Army sup- ers’ backs until carts were available. When the column
ply section. Another means of procuring supplies may reached Platero, roughly another 20 carabao carts were
7
have been from the evacuation and portable surgical added to the column by locals. As the column passed
hospitals that operated in the vicinity. through additional villages along its exfiltration route,
additional carabao carts were donated by the Filipino

Medical Operations of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion 71