Page 59 - JSOM Spring 2025
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              BOX 1  Timeline of Bataclan Concert Hall Attack, 13 November 2015  maneuvers.   The after-action commentary shows that when
              Action                                     Time      casualties were in a safe position, the focus was “. . . stopping
              Attack                                     21:47   external bleeding, freeing the upper respiratory tract, managing
                                                                 thoracic wounds, ensuring rapid evacuations while providing
              Arrival Team 1 BRI PP
              (Research and Intervention Brigade of Paris)   22:32  fluid resuscitation and tranexamic acid administration, anal-
                                                                                             4
              Arrival of Rapid Response Team             22:34   gesia and preventing hypothermia.”   The commentary listed
                                                                 equipment as tactical tourniquets, hemostatic QuikClot Com-
              Arrival of RAID (French National Police Intervention
              Unit) Team 2                               22:42   bat Gauze (Z-Medica,  Wallingford, CT) combat gauze, and
              Arrival of RAID team 1 and 2 doctors       22:58   multiple types of bandages for the BLS teams. ALS teams also
              • Small armored vehicle sent – stretchers for evacuation   carried pneumatic tourniquets, needles/tubes for chest decom-
                via passage Saint-Pierre Amelot          23:04   pression, and perfusion kits. 4
              • Entry of tactical doctors into Bataclan Concert Hall
              Phase 1                                            Interventions
              • Organization of casualties in the entrance by doctor 1  The 3 tactical physicians immediately identified more than a
              •  Commencement of first aid in orchestra pit by doctors   hundred casualties and dozens of fatalities. RAID operators
                1 and 2                                          then proceeded to establish the threat zones with police op-
              Chain formed between pit and Level B               erations and safety as the priority. RAID established the dan-
              Chain formed between Level B and victims’ assembly point  ger or hot area, referred to by RAID as the “exclusion zone.”
                                                                 This zone was restricted to RAID and BRI operators only due
              • POINT (Paris Fire Brigade on rue Oberkampf) first aid
                measures commence                        23:47   to the perceived explosive threat. The conventional prehospi-
              • Doctor 1 and doctor 2 evacuation of level 0 completed  tal response remained outside this exclusion zone. While the
              Arrival of 2nd BRI doctor and 4th RAID doctor      RAID police officers prepared to neutralize the threat, 2 RAID
                                                                 tactical physicians performed triage in the hot area, referred
              Phase 2                                            to in the commentary as the “combat zone.” This triage aimed
              Request for Fire Brigade to provide means of evacuation of  23:50  to establish the walking casualties and direct them to a place
              1st floor                                          of safety. Established at the theatre entrance was a dressing
              • Request for Fire Brigade to move victims’ assembly point
                by doctor 1                              23:58   station, safe from firearms but within the threat zone of explo-
              • Doctor 1 joins RAID team 2 for Level 1 and above  sion; this risk element restricted the entrance of conventional
              Establishment of chain by ladder Balcony to Level 1   rescue teams to reach the dressing station.
              evacuation of >85 persons
              BRI & RAID assault                         00:18   Treatments undertaken in the hot area by RAID tactical phy-
              • Assault support from RAID doctor 2 and BRI doctor.  01:00  sicians were:
              • Evacuation via balcony completed.
              End of RAID doctor intervention.           01:20   •  Fifteen casualties had tourniquets applied.
              BRI = Research and Intervention Brigade; RAID = Research, Assis-  •  Fifteen casualties underwent wound compression with he-
              tance, Intervention, Deterrence.                     mostatic dressings.
                                                                 •  Two were administered subcutaneous morphine.
              emergency means.”  Medical operations were undertaken so   •  Two received tranexamic acid (antifibrinolytic agent).
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              as not to compromise the mission of the police or the safety   •  Two had thoracic exsufflations (treatment of pneumothorax).
              of personnel.
                                                                 “Salvage therapies were performed”  and 50 casualties were
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              Potential injuries from mass violence events RAID responds to   carried out of the hot area to the dressing stations, with pri-
              are from ballistic projectiles (such as those found in the Bata-  ority given to the most severely compromised. Tactical physi-
              clan incident), and these injuries require rapid triage, LSI, and   cians instigated this tactic to move the injured out of the direct
              transport to an appropriate facility. The RAID physician’s role   line of fire to a less dangerous area—the dressing station—
              is to overcome the time required to neutralize the threat and   and closer to the conventional prehospital care providers. At
              the time taken to commence early LSI.              this stage, an additional 2 tactical physicians began “damage
                                                                 control resuscitation”  to casualties in the dressing station,
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              After-action reviews showed that the presence of clinicians em-  as the original 2 tactical physicians re-joined the PTG to act
              bedded in the PTGs and collaboration between PTGs and con-  as forward medical officers. Damage control consisted of
              ventional prehospital teams led to effective/efficient treatment   maintaining blood pressure at the lowest level to maintain
              regimens and extrication of casualties to the cold area and,   consciousness, maintaining body temperatures, and using
              eventually, hospitals. The quick action taken has been credited   tourniquets, vasoconstrictors, or tranexamic acid. 11
              to have increased the survival rate ; the mortality rate at day
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              7 was 1.3%.  The 2008 Mumbai attacks, which had no or de-  Multiple police officers joined the dressing station and ferried
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              layed prehospital care, showed overall fatality at 42.06% and   the wounded to the casualty collection point (CCP), where
              on-scene mortality at 94.7%; 64.91% had bullet wounds, and   conventional prehospital teams were waiting under the super-
              26.31% died of blast injuries. The on-scene Mumbai mortality   vision of a tactical physician. Due to the threat of explosive
              due to bullet injuries was 91.85%.  Weapons used in both at-  devices, and despite the attackers’ neutralization, conventional
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              tacks were AK-47 rifles.                           prehospital teams were maintained in the cold area until the
                                                                 end of “mine-clearing operations’’  (ensuring there was no ex-
                                                                                           10
              Within the hot area, RAID performed essential prehospital re-  plosive ordnance). Before transferring patients to the CCP, the
              suscitation procedures only.  These “rescue procedures” were   5 RAID physicians continued to perform damage control re-
                                   9
              hemostasis, decompression of pneumothorax, and basic airway   suscitation. All living casualties had already been extracted by
                                                                                 Enhancing Tactical Medical Responses  |  57
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